Bidding behavior in competing auctions: evidence from eBay
Anwar, Sajid, McMillan, Robert, and Zheng, Mingli (2006) Bidding behavior in competing auctions: evidence from eBay. European Economic Review, 50 (2). pp. 307-322.
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Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.
|Item Type:||Article (Refereed Research - C1)|
|Keywords:||competing auction; cross-bidding; auction empirics|
|FoR Codes:||14 ECONOMICS > 1402 Applied Economics > 140299 Applied Economics not elsewhere classified @ 100%|
|SEO Codes:||91 ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK > 9102 Microeconomics > 910209 Preference, Behaviour and Welfare @ 100%|
|Deposited On:||16 Feb 2010 14:19|
|Last Modified:||03 May 2013 00:52|
Last 12 Months: 6
|Citation Counts with External Providers:||Web of Science: 27|
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