Markets, transaction costs and institutions: compensating for nuclear risk in Japan
Lesbirel, S. Hayden (2003) Markets, transaction costs and institutions: compensating for nuclear risk in Japan. Australian Journal of Political Science, 38 (1). pp. 5-23.
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This article explores the nature, role and effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in managing the political constraints to the siting or development of nuclear projects in Japan. Statistical analysis reveals that the relationship between compensation and income is a key dynamic characterising the history of the marketplace for nuclear facilities in Japan. The commodification and trading of risks for benefits is governed by a sophisticated institutional and policy framework which acts to lower the transaction costs of market exchange. The interaction between the market and the institutional dynamic has generated a curious pattern of both NIMBY ('not in my backyard') and YIMBY ('yes, in my backyard') responses to nuclear development in Japan.
|Item Type:||Article (Refereed Research - C1)|
|Keywords:||facility siting; NIMBY; nuclear facilities; political resistance|
|FoR Codes:||16 STUDIES IN HUMAN SOCIETY > 1605 Policy and Administration > 160599 Policy and Administration not elsewhere classified @ 100%|
|SEO Codes:||96 ENVIRONMENT > 9699 Other Environment > 969999 Environment not elsewhere classified @ 100%|
|Deposited On:||15 Feb 2010 09:33|
|Last Modified:||21 May 2013 00:49|
Last 12 Months: 0
|Citation Counts with External Providers:||Web of Science: 1|
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