Neo counter-insurgency: Vietnam redux?

Abstract

This thesis argues that current counter-insurgency doctrine, theory and practice as employed by the militaries of the Coalition (America, Australia and Britain) overlooks critical relationships between counter-insurgency variables in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Current counter-insurgency doctrine is thus falling dangerously short in its attempts to pacify the insurgencies of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the wider War on Terror. The need for the recalibration of the current counter-insurgency model employed by the Coalition and endorsed by most experts in the field of counter-insurgency has come to be of critical importance, particularly given the shortfalls of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns, shortfalls of which have become painfully evident in recent times. This thesis will therefore argue that the Coalition needs to develop an operational model of counter-insurgency warfare that better understands the field’s dynamics as a whole if it is to prevail in the counter-insurgency conflicts of today and tomorrow.