Scalar product-based distributed oblivious transfer
Corniaux, Christian L.F., and Ghodosi, Hossein (2011) Scalar product-based distributed oblivious transfer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6829 . pp. 338-354.
|PDF (Published Version) - Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader|
View at Publisher Website: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-2420...
In a distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) the sender is replaced with m servers, and the receiver must contact k (k ≤ m) of these servers to learn the secret of her choice. Naor and Pinkas introduced the first unconditionally secure DOT for a sender holding two secrets. Blundo, D'Arco, Santis, and Stinson generalized Naor and Pinkas’s protocol, in the case that the sender holds n secrets, in the first so-called (k, m)-DOT- protocol. Such a protocol should be secure against a coalition of less than k parties. However, Blundo et al. have shown that this level of security is impossible to achieve in one-round polynomial-based constructions.
In this paper, we show that if communication is allowed amongst the servers, we are able to construct an unconditionally secure, polynomial-based (k, m)-DOT- protocol with the highest level of security. More precisely, in our construction, a receiver who contacts k servers and corrupt up to k − 1 servers (not necessarily from the set of the contacted servers) cannot learn more than one secret.
|Item Type:||Article (Refereed Research - C1)|
|Keywords:||oblivious transfer, unconditional security, secret sharing scheme|
|FoR Codes:||08 INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES > 0805 Distributed Computing > 080503 Networking and Communications @ 100%|
|SEO Codes:||89 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES > 8903 Information Services > 890399 Information Services not elsewhere classified @ 100%|
|Deposited On:||31 Oct 2011 21:27|
|Last Modified:||31 Oct 2011 21:27|
Last 12 Months: 0
Repository Staff Only: item control page